Supreme Court Curbs Agency-Head Removal Protections in Trump v. Slaughter and Trump v. Cook: Implications for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

In a pair of decisions issued on June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the constitutional authority of the President to remove appointed Executive Branch officers. In Trump v. Slaughter,¹ the Court, by a vote of 6–3, struck down as unconstitutional a federal law that bars the President from firing commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) except in cases of inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance — often referred to as “for-cause” removal protections. In the process, the Court overruled its longstanding decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which had upheld Congress’s power to shield members of independent agencies from being removed at will by the President. But in Trump v. Cook,² the Court, by a vote of 5–4, held that Lisa Cook, a member of Federal Reserve System’s (the “Federal Reserve”) Board of Governors, could remain in her job while her challenge to her attempted removal by President Donald J. Trump continued through the lower courts, citing the Federal Reserve’s unique and longstanding historical tradition of insulation from political pressures.

Slaughter and Cook are likely to affect the constitutional status of removal protections for officers across the Executive Branch, including for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”). Most directly, FERC commissioners are very likely subject to removal from office by the President, at will. For FERC administrative law judges (“ALJs”), the implications are less clear, although the constitutionality of their good-cause removal protections is at least in serious doubt, which may raise questions and concerns about the impartiality and fairness of FERC administrative adjudications.

Trump v. Slaughter

By statute, the FTC consists of a five-member body of commissioners, no more than three of whom may come from the same political party and each of whom is subject to removal only for cause. In March 2025, and after President Trump’s appointment of a new chairperson, the FTC had two Democratic and two Republican commissioners. President Trump, though, purported to remove the two Democratic commissioners, Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya. Notwithstanding the statutory for-cause removal protections,³ President Trump did not assert any “cause” for the two commissioners’ removal, instead merely asserting that their continued tenure “was inconsistent with his Administration’s priorities.”⁴ Slaughter challenged her purported removal, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to restore her to office. The district court granted summary judgment in Slaughter’s favor, and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The Supreme Court stayed the district court’s order and granted certiorari before the D.C. Circuit had ruled on the merits.

Writing for a six-Justice majority, Chief Justice John G. Roberts held that for-cause removal protections for principal officers of executive agencies are “contrary to the separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution.”⁵ The Court explained that, as a matter of Constitutional text, structure, and historical tradition, the “executive power” enshrined in Article II of the U.S. Constitution is held by a single executive figure (the President), from whom subordinates in the Executive Branch derive their authority. Those subordinates, in turn, are “subject to the President’s superintendence” and must “be removable by [the President] at will.”⁶ The Court detailed historical evidence evincing early congressional and judicial acceptance of that tradition.

The Court then turned to its earlier decision in Humphrey’s Executor, which held that the FTC’s commissioners exercise “predominately quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative” authority and, as a result, may be protected by Congress from removal by the President.⁷ Looking to how Humphrey’s Executor has evolved and been interpreted over the ensuing decades, the majority concluded that Humphrey’s Executor “has not withstood the test of time” and had been undermined and narrowed by subsequent decisions, and the Court overruled whatever “is left of Humphrey’s.”⁸

The Court adopted a bright-line standard that if an agency “exercises executive power,” including the power to “‘execute[]’ a congressional mandate against private parties,” then its principal officers are subject to at-will removal by the President under the Constitution.⁹ The Court identified at least three hallmarks of the exercise of executive power, concluding that with regard to the FTC’s current form and statutory powers, the unconstitutionality of its statutory for-cause removal restrictions was “not a close case”:

• An agency’s “power to promulgate substantive rules that carry the force of law.”
• An agency’s authority to “not only investigate[] businesses to ensure they comply with its statutes and rules” but also to “enforce[] those statutes and rules through in-house adjudications.” This includes the power to “place the onus on a private party to comply with its orders—on pain of monetary penalties—before the case reaches the courts.”
• An agency’s authority to “file[] civil suits on behalf of the United States in federal court.”¹⁰

The Court concluded that the FTC “unquestionably exercises” the above-described “executive power[s], and must therefore be controlled by the Chief Executive.”¹¹ The Court, however, declined precisely “to define the bounds of what [executive] power entails,” and explained that certain congressionally created entities, such as the Federal Reserve (see infra), may be outside the President’s plenary control.¹² Among other things, the Court left “for another day” questions regarding the permissibility of removal protections for judges of non-Article III courts (e.g., U.S. Tax Court and Court of Federal Claims).¹³

Trump v. Cook

Under President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Lisa Cook had been nominated and confirmed to a full term as a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, with her term set to expire in 2038. In August 2025, however, President Trump purported to fire Cook for cause, alleging that Cook had made false statements as part of a mortgage loan application before her Board appointment. Cook sued, asserting that her purported removal by President Trump was not actually for “cause” and that the President had unlawfully attempted to remove her without sufficient notice and opportunity to respond. The district court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent her removal, and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit declined to stay the injunction.

Following several rounds of briefing and oral argument, the Supreme Court likewise declined to stay the injunction, ruling against the Trump administration and thereby allowing Cook to remain in office pending the outcome of her lawsuit. Again writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that accepting any of the Trump administration’s arguments on the merits “would in effect transform the Federal Reserve’s for-cause protection into at-will employment—an interpretive leap out of step with the statute Congress enacted and our Nation’s tradition of central banking protected from political interference.”¹⁴

The Court first rejected the Government’s contention that the President’s determination of “cause” is judicially unreviewable. The Court next explained that what constitutes “cause” regarding removal of members of the Board of Governors is informed by the Federal Reserve’s place as an independent body, “remove[d] from the ordinary political process.”¹⁵ The Court determined that “cause” in this context is “a substantial threshold” that requires a showing of the member’s “unfitness” for the position.¹⁶ And the Court rejected the argument that courts lacked equitable power to require reinstatement during the pendency of litigation — i.e., it rejected the Government’s position that the only available remedy was a later award of backpay. Finally, the Court concluded that the Trump administration failed to afford Cook the procedural protections afforded by statute, namely notice and an opportunity for hearing afforded executive officeholders subject to for-cause protections. On this point, the Court rejected Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissenting position that for-cause protections for members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors are unconstitutional. Stating that it saw “no reason to leave the public in limbo, or to sow doubt as to the status of one of our Nation’s (and the world’s) most important financial institutions,” the Court expressly upheld “the constitutionality of the Federal Reserve as currently structured and with its existing enforcement authorities.”¹⁷ In doing so, the Court pointed to the unique historical tradition of the Federal Reserve (and the Banks of the United States before it) as an independent body regulating monetary policy, supporting the constitutionality of for-cause protections for members of its Board of Governors.

What Slaughter and Cook mean for FERC

Below, we address the potential implications of Slaughter and Cook for formerly “independent” agencies throughout the Executive Branch, with a particular emphasis on their implications for FERC. Under Slaughter, FERC’s commissioners will almost certainly be subject to removal by the President at will, without cause. Slaughter and Cook, however, leave open or generate new questions regarding other issues, especially regarding the status of inferior officers, a group that likely includes in-house ALJs.

• Principal officers of other independent executive agencies. Slaughter and Cook specifically concerned a “principal officer” of the FTC and Federal Reserve, respectively. Principal officers, most typically the heads of an agency, may be appointed only by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, per the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.¹⁸ Slaughter holds that the Constitution vests the President with discretion to remove, at will, a principal officer who exercises executive power. To determine whether such an officer exercises executive power (and without attempting to define the outer bounds of that category), the Court in Slaughter looked to the powers enjoyed by the relevant agency, namely its ability to promulgate substantive rules with the force of law, investigate regulated entities for violation of those rules, enforce those rules through in-house adjudications, and bring civil suits on behalf of the United States in federal court.

Many executive agencies previously understood as “independent” exercise such powers, meaning that Slaughter most likely renders unconstitutional the statutory removal protections that would otherwise apply to their principal officers. Indeed, in the last year, the Supreme Court has effectively approved President Trump’s at-will removal of members of the FTC, National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), and Consumer Product Safety Commission, via actions on stay motions and otherwise.¹⁹ The same result would almost certainly hold true for removal of FERC commissioners, given that FERC exercises each of the categories of authority the Slaughter Court identified as to the FTC.

• Inferior officers of independent executive agencies. Neither Slaughter nor Cook address the status of so-called “inferior officers,” who are subject to the Appointments Clause but may be appointed by the President alone, a court, or a department head.²⁰ Notably, neither majority decision addressed the Court’s prior decision in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), which held that Congress may “limit and restrict the power of removal” as to inferior officers.²¹ As the dissenting Justices in Slaughter pointed out, the question thus remains open whether Slaughter’snew approach to removal protections extends beyond principal officers to affect inferior officers.²²
• ALJs. In Lucia v. SEC, the Supreme Court appeared to accept that ALJs were inferior officers, subject to the constraints of the Appointments Clause.²³ FERC has adopted the same view, characterizing its ALJs as inferior officers, appointed by the FERC Chair.²⁴ And pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, FERC ALJs may be removed only for good cause, as determined by the MSPB.²⁵ Because neither Slaughter nor Cook explicitly addresses removal protections for inferior officers, the decisions may not have an immediate, “self-executing” impact on the status of the good-cause protection for FERC ALJs.

That said, Slaughter characterizes the authority to enforce statutes and rules “through in-house adjudications,” and impose monetary penalties to ensure compliance with administrative adjudicative decisions, as exercises of executive power.²⁶ ALJs often play those roles, and more.²⁷ More generally, Slaughter contains broad language suggesting that Article II requires that the President be able to “remove his subordinates at will,” such that even the “lowest officers” are in a “chain of dependence” on the President.²⁸ Slaughter thus casts doubt on the constitutionality of removal protections for ALJs (among other federal officers and employees) because such restrictions insulate ALJs from presidential control.

Due process, fairness, and/or impartiality concerns may arise if the “judge” and final decisionmakers in a FERC proceeding (i.e., the FERC ALJ presiding over a trial-type hearing, and individual FERC commissioners as ultimate decisionmakers) are subject to at-will removal by the President. Indeed, the Slaughter and Cook cases illustrate and may portend the increasing willingness of Presidents to exert greater control over Executive Branch officials, perhaps for political or policy-related reasons.

• The Federal Reserve exception. As a practical matter, Slaughter is the more impactful decision for most regulated parties, given the sheer number and broad subject-matter scope of formerly “independent” agencies throughout the federal government. Cook illustrates, however, that there is at least one exception to the President’s unfettered control of executive officers: the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. Cook at least arguably leaves open the door for litigants to argue that because a particular agency has a “long tradition of” exercising executive power “independent of . . . executive influence,” its officers may be insulated from at-will removal.²⁹ That said, it would not be surprising if the Federal Reserve ultimately proves to be the lone exception among agencies that exercise some executive authority. If nothing else, it is unlikely that FERC commissioners could demonstrate the same type of longstanding tradition of insulation.

¹Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, slip op. (June 29, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-332_qn12.pdf.

²Trump v. Cook, No. 25A312, slip op. (June 29, 2026), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25a312_5468.pdf.

³See 15 U.S.C. § 41.

⁴Slaughter,slip op. 3 (alterations omitted).

⁵Id. at 2; see also id. at 4–5.

⁶Id. at 8.

⁷Id. at 18 (quoting Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 624).

⁸Id. at 20, 21.

⁹Id. at 22, 27.

¹⁰Id. at 25–27.

¹¹Id. at 27.

¹²Id. at 27–28.

¹³Id. at 28.

¹⁴Cook,slip op. 9.

¹⁵Id. at 14.

¹⁶Id. (citation omitted).

¹⁷Id. at 22 n.6, 24.

¹⁸See Lucia v. SEC, 585 U.S. 237, 244 n.3 (2018).

¹⁹See Trump v. Slaughter, 146 S. Ct. 18, 18 (Sept. 22, 2025) (FTC; granting stay of preliminary injunction against removal); Trump v. Boyle, 145 S. Ct. 2653, 2654 (July 23, 2025) (Consumer Product Safety Commission; same); Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1416 (May 22, 2025) (NLRB and MSPB; same).

²⁰Lucia, 585 U.S. at 244 & n.3.

²¹Perkins, 116 U.S. at 485; see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 U.S. 197, 204 (2020) (citing Perkins and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), along with Humphrey’s Executor, as recognizing the “two exceptions to the President’s unrestricted removal power”).

²²Slaughter, slip op. 45 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).

²³See Lucia, 585 U.S. at 244 n.3 (acknowledging that both parties “view the SEC’s ALJs as inferior officers” and “that the Commission, as a head of department, can constitutionally appoint them”).

²⁴See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Sys. Energy Res., Inc., 184 FERC ¶ 61,097, at P 131 (2023).

²⁵Id. at PP 125 & n.263, 131–32 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)).

²⁶Slaughter,slip op. 26.

²⁷See Lucia, 585 U.S. at 247–49 (describing role and duties of SEC ALJs).

²⁸Slaughter, slip op. 10, 13 (citation omitted); see also id. at 36 (“Subordinates who exercise the President’s power are subject to removal by him.”).

²⁹Cook,slip op. 26; id. at 2 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

This information is provided by Vinson & Elkins LLP for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended, nor should it be construed, as legal advice.