On 13 May 2026, it was announced that a Nuclear Regulation Bill would be introduced for discussion in the upcoming parliamentary session.1 With Parliament returning from its conference recess, this article forms the final part of a three-part exploration of the Nuclear Regulation Bill (the “Bill”) and three further categories of change that are expected from the Government as part of its ‘Objective 2’ (although at the time of writing, the detailed provisions of the Bill have not yet been published).2
1. Reform of the Planning Consent Regime for Nuclear Projects
The “Nuclear Regulatory Review 2025” (the “Fingleton Review”) identified the planning consent process as a significant source of delay and cost for nuclear developers, finding that planning applications for nuclear projects take much longer than for comparable infrastructure, and that the existing framework is not well calibrated for current (and future) nuclear technologies.3 The Bill is expected to streamline the planning process under the Planning Act 2008 for nuclear Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects (“NSIPs”), particularly the process for obtaining Development Consent Orders which are required for such projects (“DCOs”).4
What’s the difference?
Under the current regime, nuclear power stations with a generating capacity above 50 megawatts are classified as NSIPs pursuant to sections 14(1)(a) and 15(2) of the Planning Act 2008, and accordingly require a DCO from the Secretary of State.5 The DCO process is lengthy and resource-intensive, requiring applicants to undertake extensive pre-application consultation, prepare detailed environmental assessments and navigate a formal examination process before a decision is reached.
Part of the DCO process requires an assessment against the framework set out in the National Policy Statement (“NPS”) for Nuclear Power Generation, (“EN-6”).6 However, the NPS criteria were formulated for conventional large-scale reactor designs, meaning that the current framework provides limited support for developers seeking to deploy small modular reactors (“SMRs”) or advanced modular reactors (“AMRs”) on sites not contemplated by the original Strategic Siting Assessment (“SSA”). EN-7, designated in 2024, provided an updated policy framework for new nuclear generation, but the Government has now committed to further updates to ensure the NPS framework keeps pace with technological and policy developments.7
Why does it matter?
Once the NPS framework is updated, it is hoped that the DCO process can be similarly streamlined and the planning process as a whole made more straightforward, reducing both time and costs for developers. An updated and expanded NPS framework, reflecting the full range of reactor technologies now available, could also unlock new sites and provide the policy certainty that developers seek to advance new projects. However, applicants with projects already in the DCO pipeline will need to consider the transitional provisions carefully and how these might affect ongoing applications, and developers targeting newly designated sites should engage early with the relevant planning and local authorities to manage expectations and minimise any potential misalignment and delay.
2. Reform of Environmental Assessment Requirements
The Fingleton Review concluded that the environmental assessment process for nuclear projects had become disproportionately burdensome, with Environmental Statements running to thousands of pages.8 The Bill is expected to replace the existing Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) regime for nuclear projects with the new Environmental Outcomes Reports approach, first introduced by Part 3 of the Levelling Up and Regeneration Act 2023 (“LURA”).9
What’s the difference?
EIAs for NSIPs, including nuclear projects, are currently governed by the Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017, which derive from retained EU law.10 Applicants are required to submit an Environmental Statement explaining the effects of any proposed development on the environment. For nuclear projects, Environmental Statements have historically been exceptionally long, detailed and complex, reflecting the current environmental framework’s cautious approach to environmental risk. In addition, nuclear projects typically require assessment under the Habitats Regulations, introducing a further layer of complexity and potential delay.
The Government has now committed to implementing an outcomes-based approach to environmental assessment for nuclear projects, moving away from the current model of tick-box compliance towards the achievement of genuine environmental outcomes.11 The Government has also signalled that a more proportionate approach to the interaction between nuclear development and Habitats Regulations may be introduced, though the precise mechanisms remain to be confirmed.12
Why does it matter?
The transition from the EIA to Environmental Outcomes Reports is another change which has the potential to significantly reduce both the cost and time associated with the current process. An outcomes-based approach should allow developers to take a more practical approach to environmental compliance, rather than producing extensive documents simply to satisfy procedural requirements. However, there will likely be a transitional period during which the existing EIA framework and the emerging Environmental Outcomes Reports system operate in parallel, and developers will need to plan their assessment strategies accordingly.
3. Siting Policy Reform
The Fingleton Review recommended a shift away from the existing, restrictive site nomination process that had confined new nuclear development to a small number of pre-designated sites, on the basis that this strategy was no longer appropriate for the emerging landscape of SMRs and AMRs.13 The Bill is expected to introduce a more flexible, pragmatic approach to nuclear siting which contemplates these new technologies.14
What’s the difference?
The current siting framework is contained in EN-6, the product of the SSA process which was carried out between 2009 and 2011. It is contemplates an exclusive list of a finite number of sites designated for nuclear development in the UK, and was designed to apply to large gigawatt-scale reactors. The result is that it is inherently ill-suited to the newer technological requirements of SMRs and AMRs (which typically have smaller footprints, different cooling requirements, and have more flexible siting needs than conventional large-scale reactors).
The Government has now committed to reviewing and expanding the criteria for nuclear site selection to accommodate SMRs and AMRs, and it is anticipated that the reforms will introduce a criteria-based siting approach, under which developers would be able to bring forward sites that meet defined suitability criteria, rather than being confined to a closed list of pre-designated locations.15
Why does it matter?
The provision of a more flexible siting framework would likely mean significant new development opportunities, particularly for SMR and AMR developers who have been historically constrained by the limited number of designated sites available for new nuclear projects. It is hoped that an ability to propose new sites, matched to the specific requirements of the technology to be sited, will encourage innovation and speed up the development of the UK’s nuclear industry. However, the practical success of this reform will depend on the exact criteria that are ultimately adopted and how pragmatic those criteria really are. Early engagement with local planning authorities, local communities and statutory environmental bodies will be important for developers.
Conclusion
The question of ‘the chicken or the egg’, discussed in Part 1, is equally pertinent here: developers need planning and siting certainty before they can commit the capital required to bring new nuclear projects forward, whilst the Government needs to see credible project proposals before it can justify the political expenditure of reforming a complex and sensitive regulatory landscape. The reforms under Objective 2, if enacted as anticipated, should go a considerable way towards breaking that cycle.
[1] https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-kings-speech-2026.
[2] In its “Building Our Nuclear Nation” publication, in response to the Fingleton Review, the Government consolidated Fingleton’s recommendations into two core ‘objectives’. Objective 1 is concerned with ‘reinvigorating Britain’s nuclear sector’ through reform to the regulatory bodies and structures currently in place, across both civil and defence projects. Objective 2 is concerned with reform to the existing planning and environmental assessments.
[3]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/692080f75c394e481336ab89/nuclear-regulatory-review-2025.pdf, Chapter 7 – Environmental Assessments & Permitting.
[4]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Reforming and accelerating the foundations of the planning system’.
[5]Planning Act 2008, sections 14(1)(a) and 15(2): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/29/contents
[6]National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-6), designated July 2011.
[7]National Policy Statement for Nuclear Power Generation (EN-7), designated 2024. See also Overarching National Policy Statement for Energy (EN-1): https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/overarching-national-policy-statement-for-energy-en-1.
[8]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/692080f75c394e481336ab89/nuclear-regulatory-review-2025.pdf, Chapter 7 – Environmental Assessments & Permitting.
[9]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Environmental Impact Assessments’.
[10]Infrastructure Planning (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017 (SI 2017/572): https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/572/contents.
[11]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Environmental Impact Assessments’.
[12]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Habitats Regulations’.
[13]https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/692080f75c394e481336ab89/nuclear-regulatory-review-2025.pdf, Chapter 7 – Environmental Assessments & Permitting.
[14]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Fleet delivery and siting’.
[15]https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025/building-our-nuclear-nation-government-response-to-the-nuclear-regulatory-review-2025-accessible-webpage, Objective 2, ‘Fleet delivery and siting’.