FTC Commissioners Present Diverging Priorities for the Agency’s Future

It is a new era for the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Trump v. Slaughter, delivered in June 2026, authorized President Trump’s March 2025 firing of two Democratic FTC commissioners and confirmed the president’s power to remove FTC leadership at will and without cause, ending over a century of relative political independence for the FTC and other independent agencies. A third commissioner, a Republican, voluntarily resigned in November 2025. Further, recent actions and statements by the two remaining FTC commissioners have highlighted how their visions for the agency’s future may differ in application. Although change at the FTC is certain, the commissioners’ different priorities could push the scope of the FTC’s powers and its enforcement priorities in new and uncertain directions.

The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (“FTC Act”) stipulates that the FTC be led by five commissioners, although the agency has frequently operated with fewer, and a quorum only requires a majority of the commissioners in office and not recused.^[1] The chair leads the FTC but has equal voting powers with the other commissioners. The FTC Act states that the president may remove commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”^[2] On March 18, 2025, President Trump removed Democratic commissioners Alvaro Bedoya and Rebecca Slaughter, who challenged their firings as without cause and therefore unlawful. The Supreme Court upheld the removals in Trump v. Slaughter. Republican Commissioner Melissa Holyoak resigned on November 17, 2025, leaving Chair Andrew N. Ferguson and Commissioner Mark R. Meador, both Republicans, as the FTC’s only sitting commissioners. In January 2026, President Trump nominated automotive accessories CEO David MacNeil as the FTC’s third Republican commissioner, but as of September 2026, MacNeil has not been confirmed by the Senate.

Ferguson and Meador have almost always voted together, but a split emerged in July 2026 during the FTC’s review of quantum computing developer IonQ Inc.’s (“IonQ”) proposed acquisition of SkyWater Technology, Inc. (“SkyWater”), a quantum chip fabrication company. Ferguson identified competition concerns with the deal, arguing in a statement that the transaction could allow IonQ to restrict the supply of SkyWater’s chips and services to rivals and provide IonQ with access to rivals’ sensitive technical information. Ferguson supported a proposed consent order negotiated by FTC staff that would have required behavioral remedies aimed at protecting “efforts in the United States to achieve fault-tolerant quantum computing first, ahead of rival nations.” However, Meador argued in a separate statement that the risk of competitive harm was “too narrow, too short-lived, and too speculative” to justify either a legal challenge or negotiated remedies. He also argued that the relevant market shares fell below the legal thresholds in the 2023 Merger Guidelines, that SkyWater did not supply “must have” inputs to IonQ’s rivals, and that the quantum computing industry was “highly dynamic” and diversified. With the commissioners split 1-1 on remedies, and with neither commissioner interested in suing to block the merger outright, the FTC had no other option but to allow IonQ and SkyWater to close the transaction without conditions.

Recent statements from Ferguson and Meador also reveal similarities and differences in their enforcement priorities. On September 5, 2026, Ferguson delivered remarks at the International Bar Association’s 30th Annual Competition Conference, outlining his “more ‘populist’ vision” of competition enforcement. Ferguson argued that “prudent enforcement of competition law” must promote “profit-seeking” for “the general welfare of our nation’s citizens.” Ferguson focused on vertical mergers, which he characterized as often producing “both anticompetitive harms and pro-competitive efficiencies.” Ferguson promoted behavioral remedies “informed by rigorous analysis and history” aimed at mitigating “short-term concerns—like temporary supply-substitution difficulties . . . while preserving the long-term benefits.” These remarks are consistent with Ferguson’s national security concerns and his preference for behavioral remedies over either litigation or a hands-off approach in the IonQ-SkyWater transaction.

On September 14, 2026, Meador delivered his own remarks at the George Washington University Law School regarding his vision for “the future of the FTC.” Meador lauded the Trump v. Slaughter decision for returning “democratic accountability” to the FTC and argued that the FTC’s prior “institutional insularity and dogmatism” prevented it from fully asserting its authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce.^[3] Meador criticized a 2015 FTC policy statement, which generally limited enforcement of Section 5 to acts and practices that also violated the principal antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.^[4] Instead, he advocated for “restoring Section 5’s independent function” by challenging practices beyond core antitrust violations. Meador also supported the FTC’s exercise of its “broad powers” to conduct market studies and make recommendations to Congress. In addition, he advocated for the FTC to use its little-used powers under Section 7 of the FTC Act to serve as a “master in chancery” and recommend proposed remedies in antitrust litigation to federal courts.

In summary, both Ferguson and Meador support a more politically responsive FTC following the Trump v. Slaughter decision, moving away from past conceptions of the agency as a politically insulated and technocratic body of experts. Still, each commissioner’s remarks focused on different priorities for the agency. While Ferguson advocated for a “prudent” and measured approach to enforcement and remedies, Meador supported the FTC employing its powers in historically uncommon ways. These different preferred approaches indicate that the commissioners could again diverge on policy initiatives and enforcement actions, as they did in the IonQ-SkyWater transaction.

For companies, a new era for the FTC means new risks and challenges for compliance with antitrust law. The Trump v. Slaughter decision and the commissioners’ recent statements suggest that FTC policy will likely become more volatile. Since the president may now remove commissioners at will, changes in administration could result in more rapid turnover in FTC leadership. Within the current Trump administration, the appointment of a third commissioner would likely prevent any future 1-1 ties and accelerate policy changes. Accordingly, companies considering mergers and acquisitions should reassess their exposure to investigations and enforcement actions. Ferguson’s statements have focused on vertical transactions, which the FTC has historically scrutinized less than horizontal transactions between direct competitors. In addition, a more populist FTC could place more emphasis on national competitiveness and security, as reflected in Ferguson’s concerns for U.S. quantum computing leadership in the IonQ-SkyWater transaction. Lastly, companies should monitor FTC efforts to expand its Section 5 enforcement activity, which could implicate conduct not prohibited under other antitrust laws.

^[1] 16 C.F.R. § 4.14(b).

^[2] 15 U.S.C. § 41.

^[3] 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

^[4] The FTC rescinded the 2015 policy statement in July 2021 and issued a replacement policy statement in November 2022, which recognized certain “unfair methods of competition” that may not necessarily violate the antitrust laws.

This information is provided by Vinson & Elkins LLP for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended, nor should it be construed, as legal advice.