President Trump Orders Divestment of Jupiter Systems, Citing National Security Concerns
V&E CFIUS Update
V&E CFIUS Update
By Randall Johnston, Frankie Vélez, and Jessica Spiers*
On July 8th, 2025, President Trump issued an order (the “Order”)1 forcing divestment of U.S.-based Jupiter Systems (“Jupiter”) by its China-based parent company, Suirui Group Co., Ltd. (“Suirui”), more than five years after Suirui acquired Jupiter. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”) had identified a national security risk arising from Suirui’s ownership of Jupiter, citing concerns over the use of Jupiter’s technology in “military and critical infrastructure environments.”2
The Order appears to be the result of a post-closing CFIUS review of the acquisition of Jupiter by Suirui. CFIUS has jurisdiction over any transaction resulting in control of a U.S. business by a foreign person, and its review jurisdiction has no statute of limitations. Accordingly, CFIUS can and has investigated potential national security risks years after the transaction has closed.
Jupiter is an audiovisual equipment supplier that, at least through 2021, directly and indirectly provided millions of dollars’ worth of AV equipment to the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, NASA, and the Export-Import Bank of the United States. According to the Order, CFIUS’s investigation determined that the acquisition “threatens to impair the national security of the United States” and the Order prohibits the transaction, requiring Suirui to divest ownership of Jupiter within 120 days, subject to extension.
In the Order, the president imposed interim mitigation measures requiring Suirui and its affiliates to ensure that their personnel — and the personnel of any affiliates — are prohibited from accessing Jupiter’s non-public source code, technical data, information technology systems, products, components, records, and U.S.-based facilities, unless expressly authorized by CFIUS. The Order also requires Suirui to notify CFIUS of any proposed buyer of Jupiter, and grants CFIUS the authority to object to a potential buyer. In evaluating a buyer, the Order notes that CFIUS may consider factors such as U.S. citizenship and whether the buyer has or had any direct or indirect contractual, financial, familial, or other close relationship with Suirui and its affiliates. Notably, CFIUS may impose monetary penalties if the divestment is not completed by the 120-day deadline, and has previously exercised this enforcement authority in connection with violations of divestment and mitigation obligations.3
The Order underscores the Trump administration’s ongoing focus on addressing national security risks associated with certain foreign investments, particularly those involving Chinese ownership of U.S. businesses with sensitive technology or critical infrastructure applications.
The Order is a reminder that CFIUS has broad authority to review and unwind transactions that have already closed. It highlights the importance of foreign investors assessing CFIUS risk and considering a CFIUS filing pre-closing to mitigate the risk of post-closing CFIUS intervention and forced divestment.
*Jessica Spiers is a summer associate in our Washington office.
1 https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-07-11/pdf/2025-13123.pdf
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This information is provided by Vinson & Elkins LLP for educational and informational purposes only and is not intended, nor should it be construed, as legal advice.