Regulating the Depths: International and Domestic Developments in Deep-sea Mining

This article provides a timely update on both international and U.S. domestic legal developments shaping the future of deep-sea mining. From stalled ISA negotiations and procedural controversies to the resurrection of dormant U.S. licensing frameworks and the issuance of an Executive Order prioritising seabed mining, these parallel tracks reflect differing approaches to the governance of ocean mineral resources. As these frameworks develop, questions arise about coordination, recognition, and consistency between national and international regimes — issues with significant implications for the future of ocean governance.

Under the International Framework

As reported in earlier Insights,¹ we have been following the ISA Council’s negotiations and drafting of the Exploitation Rules, Regulations and Procedures (“Exploitation RRPs”) for the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the “Area”). The first part of the ISA Council’s 30^th Session concluded on 28 March 2025.

The ISA is the autonomous international organisation established under UNCLOS. The ISA has been working on developing the Exploitation RRPs since 2014. The ISA faces a dual challenge of facilitating deep-sea mining, whilst ensuring that such activities comply with and promote the central tenets of UNCLOS, namely that that any activities must be for the benefit of the common heritage of mankind and that the marine environment is protected from any harmful effects.

There are four main takeaways from the latest ISA Council session:

1. there are growing concerns over the ISA Council’s ability to progress the negotiation of the Exploitation RRPs;
2. there is a lack of transparency in the process of establishing the thresholds under the Exploitation RRPs;
3. Nauru presented a proposal on how the ISA should handle an application for a plan of work before the Exploitation RRPs are finalised; and
4. The Metals Company announced its plans to obtain a license for deep-sea mining in the Area under the U.S. domestic framework.

Progress of the negotiations

The ISA Council completed its full reading of the consolidated text of the Exploitation RRPs last August. However, six months on and it is difficult to believe that the text will be finalised and adopted any time soon. Part I of the 30^th Session was the ISA Council’s second reading of the full draft text, and only 55 of the 107 Regulations were covered in the two week session.

Furthermore, some of the questions raised by the ISA Council members show how far the ISA Council is from a finalised text. In particular, the Netherlands questioned whether the Exploitation RRPs should apply to all three resource types found in the Area (polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt rich ferromanganese crusts) or just to the most common one, i.e., polymetallic nodules. The question is legitimate, as the ISA previously negotiated and adopted three separate sets of exploration regulations for each of the three resources. The question was raised but was not discussed during the session. If the scope of the Exploitation RRPs is still up for debate, the finalised text may still be out of reach.

The standard for environmental thresholds

A key component of the Exploitation RRPs is the standard for environmental thresholds. These thresholds will determine the limits for impact of any proposed mining activity.

The Legal and Technical Commission of the ISA (the “LTC”) has been working on developing the environmental thresholds. A number of concerns were raised by member States at the latest ISA Council sessions regarding low participation rates, closed-door meetings, and a lack of transparency in the process of consulting with external experts. There have also been concerns that the development of environmental standards for an industry that is still developing the technology for the extraction of minerals might pose “a chicken and egg” problem. The LTC consults with the industry about the environmental impacts encountered during tests, whereas the industry wants firm thresholds from the LTC to continue improving their proprietary technology to be in compliance with such thresholds.

Finally, the exercise of determining environmental thresholds is not a purely scientific one, but also a political one. The scope, applicability, development, and function of thresholds within the broader deep-sea mining regime is a question that needs to be answered politically, leading to a ping-pong dynamic between political bodies like the ISA Council and Assembly, technical-political bodies like the LTC, and external scientific experts.

Nauru and the “two-year rule”

The question of how the ISA should approach a mining application submitted before the Exploitation RRPs are finalised has been brewing since Nauru triggered the “two-year rule” in July 2023. Pursuant to paragraph 15(c) of Section 1, of the Annex to the Agreement, a State party can request that the ISA adopt the Exploitation RRPs within two years of notification, failing which (on Nauru’s interpretation) the ISA is obliged to provisionally accept a plan of work. In the latest session, Nauru added to the ISA Council agenda a proposal setting out how the ISA should handle any mining application in those circumstances.

The ISA Council members strongly opposed Nauru’s proposal. The initial reaction from some member States was that the ISA and the ISA Council must be allowed to make progress on the draft Exploitation RRPs at a pace that they deem appropriate in order to establish a robust system for exploitation. In addition, the overwhelming majority of the ISA Council reiterated their decision from 2023, which states that no mining activities should take place without finished Exploitation RRPs.

Whilst The Metals Company and its Nauruan subsidiary NORI-D have been vocal that an application for a plan of work will be submitted in June 2025, they have failed to obtain additional clarity as to how such an application will be treated by the ISA.

The Metals Company’s announcement

At the conclusion of the ISA Council meeting, The Metals Company announced that it intended to apply for a mining contract in international waters under the U.S. framework for deep-sea mining, the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (“DSHMRA”).

Under the United States’ domestic framework

On 24 April 2025, President Donald Trump signed an Executive Order called “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources”. While unexpected, the move aligns with broader policy trends in the U.S. aimed at strengthening domestic capacity for critical mineral supply.

The Executive Order (“EO”) provides for, inter alia:

1. policies supporting the development of domestic capabilities for the exploration, collection and processing of seabed mineral resources; and the investment in the science, mapping and technology required to do so;
2. the implementation of an expedited process for reviewing and issuing “seabed mineral exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits in areas beyond national jurisdiction” under the DSHMRA;
3. the mapping of private sector interest and opportunities in (i) the United States Outer Continental Shelf; (ii) areas beyond national jurisdiction; and (iii) areas within the national jurisdictions of certain other nations that express interest in partnering with United States companies on seabed mineral development;
4. policies and resources developing seabed mineral resource processing capacity on land or on vessels; and
5. the implementation of an expedited process for reviewing and approving “permits for prospecting and granting leases for exploration, development, and production of seabed mineral resources within the United States Outer Continental Shelf” under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.

The EO seeks to jumpstart the U.S. deep-sea mining industry both within and outside U.S. territorial waters. Like a number of other ‘America First’ policies, it is a reaction to China’s dominance on the critical minerals supply chain. Indeed, the EO recognises the United States’ interest in deep-sea mining in the face of the economic and national security challenges to secure critical minerals “independent of foreign adversary control”. The EO also provides for a report on private sector interest and opportunities in the United States Outer Continental Shelf, in areas beyond national jurisdiction and “in areas within the national jurisdictions of certain other nations that express interest in partnering with United States companies on seabed mineral development”. The latter apparently being a reference to small Pacific States and other coastal States with abundant polymetallic nodules like Nauru, Tonga or Japan, for example, in an effort to counter further attempts from Chinese companies from partnering with them on deep-sea mining projects and securing further control over the mineral supply chains (like China’s involvement in the Cook Islands).

The main question that arises is how any U.S. granted licenses for exploration or commercial recovery in areas beyond national jurisdiction will interact with the ISA’s legal regime. There is no direct mention of international law and the UNCLOS framework in the EO.²

The EO requires that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”) put in place an expedited process to grant “exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits in areas beyond national jurisdiction” under the DSHMRA. The DSHMRA was enacted in 1980 as an interim framework until an appropriate international one was agreed. The DSHMRA authorises NOAA to issue exploration licenses and commercial permits to U.S. citizens for seabed mining activities. Before issuing a license or permit, NOAA must assess whether the proposed activities:

“(1) Will not unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by other states, as recognized under general principles of international law;

(2) Will not conflict with any international obligation of the United States established by any treaty or international convention in force with respect to the United States;

(3) Will not create a situation which may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of international peace and security involving armed conflict;

(4) Cannot reasonably be expected to result in a significant adverse effect on the quality of the environment, taking into account the analyses and information in any applicable environmental impact statement prepared pursuant to section 1419(c) or 1419(d) of this title; and

(5) Will not pose an inordinate threat to the safety of life and property at sea.”³

In 1984, NOAA granted licences for exploration activities in four sites within the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (“CCZ”) in the Area. These licences were issued 10 years before UNCLOS entered into force and 12 years before the ISA became operational. No licenses have been issued since. The U.S. made the decision not to sign or ratify UNCLOS, but has respected the Treaty as customary international law, and even negotiated an agreement for the conservation of biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction.⁴ In 2025, only two of the licenses granted by NOAA in 1984, USA-1 and USA-4, remain in effect, although dormant.

Stakeholders will be closely monitoring how the U.S. framework and the ISA’s international regime will interact in practice. Key considerations include whether the U.S. will coordinate its licensing activities with existing ISA-designated zones — such as areas under active exploration contracts or Areas of Particular Environmental Interest (“APEIs”) — to avoid overlap and ensure environmental stewardship. For instance, part of USA-4 intersects with APEI 13, designated by the ISA in 2021,⁵ raising questions about alignment between domestic and international zoning. Additionally, the issue of international recognition of licenses issued under the DSHMRA remains open. It is not yet clear how such licenses will be viewed by the ISA or other States, given the United States’ non-party status to UNCLOS. Recent remarks by the ISA Secretary General and statements from other countries, including China, underscore the importance of maintaining dialogue and fostering cooperation to promote shared objectives.

Conclusion

As the international community works toward finalising a global regulatory framework for deep-sea mining, domestic developments in the United States reflect an alternative path focused on accelerating resource development and supply chain resilience.

The year ahead will be critical in determining how these different frameworks interact. Constructive dialogue between stakeholders — international organisations, States, private companies, and civil society — will be essential to ensure that deep-sea mining progresses in a manner that is environmentally responsible, legally coherent, and broadly inclusive.

¹ Pivotal year for deep-sea mining; Deep-sea mining: Running out of time?; Deep-sea mining: risk and uncertainty; Legal Uncertainties Muddy the Waters for Deep-Sea Mining’s Future; Coming soon? Updates on the Latest Round of Negotiations of the Draft Deep-sea Mining Regulations: Environmental Considerations; and Update on Part II of the 29th Session of the Negotiations on Deep-Sea Mining Exploitation Regulations.

² The press release issued by NOAA following the signing of the EO is similarly silent on international treaties: https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/next-gold-rush-president-trump-unlocks-access-to-critical-deep-seabed-minerals.

³ 30 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(1)–(5).

⁴ Agreement under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction Accessible at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2023/06/20230620%2004-28%20PM/Ch_XXI_10.pdf.

⁵ ISA, Environmental management plan for the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. Accessible at: https://www.isa.org.jm/protection-of-the-marine-environment/regional-environmental-management-plans/ccz/.