Focus, Fairness, & Efficiency: DOJ White Collar Policy Shifts Signal Recalibration, But Not Revolution in Enforcement

DOJ’s Focus on High-Impact Crimes

The Enforcement Memo directs federal prosecutors to exercise discretion and prioritize white-collar cases in ten high-impact areas that the Department believes cause the most harm to Americans, including such areas as health care fraud, investment fraud, anti-money laundering (“AML”) offenses, drug trafficking, and tariff and sanctions evasion. Specifically, the Enforcement Memo prioritizes the following white-collar crimes for enforcement:

1. Waste, fraud and abuse, including in health care fraud, procurement fraud and federal program fraud;
2. Trade and customs fraud and evasion;
3. Fraud associated with variable interest entities (VIEs), including offering fraud, “ramp and dumps,” elder fraud, securities fraud and other forms of market manipulation;
4. Investor frauds, such as Ponzi schemes, servicemember fraud and other frauds that threaten consumer safety;
5. Sanctions violations and enabling transactions in support of cartels, transnational criminal organizations (“TCOs”), hostile nation-states and foreign terrorist organizations;
6. Material support by corporations for foreign terrorist organizations, including recently designated cartels and TCOs;
7. Money laundering, including specifically by so-called “Chinese Money Laundering Organizations,” and other transactions involved in the manufacturing of illegal drugs;
8. Violations of the Controlled Substances Act and related food and drug laws, and specifically including the unlawful manufacture and distribution of counterfeit pills laced with fentanyl or the unlawful distribution of opioids by medical professionals and companies;
9. Bribery and associated money laundering that impact U.S. national interests, undermine U.S. national security, harm the competitiveness of U.S. businesses, and enrich foreign corrupt officials; and
10. Crimes involving digital assets that victimize investors and consumers, further other criminal conduct, and willfully facilitate other significant criminal activity, with cryptocurrency crimes connected to money laundering and sanctions evasion associated with cartels and terrorists receiving the highest priority.¹

Given the administration’s earlier guidance concerning a more targeted approach to enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),² the Enforcement Memo offers a first glimpse of what to expect from DOJ at the conclusion of the 180-day enforcement “pause” that was ordered by President Donald Trump on February 10, 2025. Based on the Enforcement Memo, it is likely that future FCPA enforcement may encompass more cases than only those touching on cartels and TCOs, and likely will align with the America First foreign policy directive and other Trump administration priorities, with future enforcement focusing more on violations by foreign companies and targeting the “demand side” of bribery by corrupt foreign officials under the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (“FEPA”).³

Expansion of DOJ’s Whistleblower Program

To complement these enforcement priorities, the Enforcement Memo announced a significant expansion of the Department’s Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program.⁴ The expanded pilot program now offers several benefits, including a bounty for whistleblowers based on any funds forfeited in connection with many resolutions relating to the prioritized enforcement areas. The updated whistleblower pilot program enables whistleblowers to receive substantial rewards when reporting about the following eight priority subject areas:

1. Violations of AML and related fraud and compliance laws by financial institutions;
2. Violations of FCPA and FEPA and related money laundering statutes;⁵
3. Corporate violations of domestic corruption and kickback statutes;
4. Violations by corporations of federal health care statutes;
5. Corporate violations of federal contracting and program fraud statutes, when such crimes do not involve health care or anti-kickback statutes;
6. Trade, tariff, and customs fraud by companies;
7. Corporate violations of federal immigration laws; and
8. Corporate violations of sanctions laws, material support of terrorism, and money laundering and related offenses associated with cartels, TCOs and illegal narcotics.

Additional Incentives in the CEP

DOJ also made revisions to its Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy in an attempt to provide additional incentives and clearer guidance for companies navigating white-collar matters. Citing an increased focus on individual misconduct under prior policies, the Enforcement Memo updates the CEP to offer additional benefits to corporations that self-disclose, cooperate, and remediate issues.

Rather than the prior policy which provided for a “presumption” of a declination to companies that voluntarily self-disclosed misconduct, DOJ has now committed to granting a declination to companies provided that there is a valid voluntary self-disclosure (meaning that DOJ first learned of the misconduct from the company), the company fully cooperates with DOJ, the company appropriately and timely remediates the misconduct, and there are no “aggravating circumstances” present. Further, if a company self-reports in good faith, but the report does not qualify as a voluntary self-disclosure (such as where a whistleblower has already alerted DOJ to the allegations), then absent aggravating circumstances, DOJ will grant the company a non-prosecution agreement with a term less than three years, allow a 75 percent reduction off the low end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines’ fine range, and will not require an independent compliance monitor.

To help illustrate its analysis, the revised CEP includes a flowchart outlining a company’s pathways to resolving white-collar matters:

While the new guidance and flow chart provide arguably clearer direction to companies, the CEP retains significant disincentives for companies to self-report. For example, companies will still be required to disgorge profits as part of any resolution, which can frequently amount to tens or hundreds of millions of dollars, and declinations remain presumptively public, which could invite third-party litigation and reputational harm. Thus, while the latest revisions of the CEP provide arguably more generous incentives, it remains to be seen whether the changes result in a meaningful increase in self-reporting when companies face this critical decision.

Efficient Resolution of White-Collar Matters

The Enforcement Memo includes explicit statements recognizing that white-collar investigations can drag on for years and impose a significant operational and financial burden even when no enforcement action is taken. As such the Enforcement Plan includes familiar directives to prosecutors to expedite investigations and charging decisions to minimize the duration and collateral impact of investigations. Although the impact of this directive remains to be seen, particularly given that corporate investigations often involve voluminous document productions and, in transnational cases, lengthy delays for responses to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (“MLAT”) requests, the Department is signaling some hope to the business community that DOJ is committed to making speedier charging decisions in the future.

Most significantly, the Enforcement Memo includes specific directives to revisit existing enforcement actions and investigations to ensure that they are fair and aligned with the new administration’s priorities. Specifically, DOJ notes that “[n]ot all corporate misconduct warrants federal criminal prosecution,” and Criminal Division Sections have been directed “to review the length of terms of all existing agreements with companies to determine if they should be terminated early.”⁶ In conducting this review and determination of whether existing supervisions can be terminated early, Department prosecutors will consider factors such as the duration of the post-resolution period, substantial reduction of a company’s risk profile, the extent of remediation and the maturity of a corporate compliance program, and whether a company self-reported misconduct. The guidance is a clear invitation to companies currently under supervision, and also those under investigation, to take the opportunity to engage with the Department to seek an early termination of any conditions imposed under a prior resolution or closure of an investigation that may have been initiated under the previous administration.

Updated Memorandum on Selection of Corporate Compliance Monitors

In another significant departure from the Biden administration’s enforcement practices, the Enforcement Memo makes clear that the imposition of independent compliance monitors will become the exception rather than the rule moving forward. In a companion memorandum on the “Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters,” the Department noted that “monitors can be an effective resource to ensure that corporate offenders comply with the terms of a corporate criminal resolution,” but the Department explained that monitors will be imposed far less frequently and will be narrowly tailored to the specific goals DOJ hopes to achieve in the future.⁷ Most notably, the Department sets forth important guidelines on what terms must be included in future monitorship agreements, including specific explanations on “the cap on hourly rates” and “approval of the monitor’s budget,” which could prove to be important safeguards against mission creep and cost overruns in the future.

What This Means for Companies

In light of DOJ’s recalibration of white-collar enforcement resources, companies should take several steps in the near term to prepare for the future.

• Re-assess the company’s risk profile in light of new enforcement focus areas. The Department’s Enforcement Memo should serve as a blueprint for corporate compliance programs to conduct new risk assessments aimed at responding to DOJ’s new white-collar enforcement priorities. DOJ’s reprioritization of certain subject areas may impact a company’s risk profile, heightening risks in some areas of the business while reducing short-term enforcement risk in others. Companies should then allocate their compliance resources accordingly.
• Consider collateral consequences in deprioritized enforcement areas. Although DOJ has deprioritized certain enforcement areas, a company’s legal exposure in those areas has not been eliminated altogether. Companies should therefore evaluate the totality of their legal risks, not just the risks of criminal enforcement.
• Boost confidence in internal reporting channels. DOJ’s expansion of its whistleblower program may lead to reports bypassing internal channels, raising the stakes where employees lack confidence in internal reporting and response mechanisms. Companies should make it easy and accessible for employees to report concerns internally, and actively encourage the use of these channels.
• Invest in demonstrably effective compliance programs. While the changes are more evolutionary than revolutionary, they do offer greater transparency and predictability for companies that act quickly and in good faith. The reduced likelihood of monitorships and the possibility of early termination of agreements should further incentivize investment in effective compliance programs.
• Reevaluate government engagement strategy. As now may be the most advantageous time ever for a company to proactively self-report, companies should consider their existing risk areas and prioritize identifying potential misconduct that might warrant self-reporting.
• Adapt to policy changes without sacrificing future defenses. Regulatory and enforcement policies are subject to change over time. Organizations should avoid making short-term decisions that could undermine their ability to defend their actions years down the line. This means maintaining robust compliance programs, thorough documentation, and a clear record of good-faith efforts to meet legal and contractual obligations, even when the immediate risk of enforcement appears low. By doing so, companies position themselves to respond effectively to any future inquiries or investigations, regardless of changes in the regulatory environment.
• If you are under active supervision from a Biden administration enforcement action or an investigation that was initiated under the prior administration, now is the time to engage with DOJ. The Trump administration has reallocated resources away from certain white-collar crimes, and the administration’s priorities differ in many significant ways from the Biden era. If you are under investigation or supervision from a legacy enforcement decision, consider engaging with DOJ now to try and obtain an early termination or closure of an investigation.

The Department’s Enforcement Memo and other May 12 policy announcements are significant revisions to DOJ’s enforcement policies and present important opportunities for companies to respond. As always, companies would be well served to seek advice from experienced counsel who understand the new administration and can help advance your interests and response.

¹ Memorandum from Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. on Focus, Fairness, and Efficiency in the Fight Against White-Collar Crime to All Criminal Division Personnel 4 (May 12, 2025).

² Memorandum from U.S. Att’y Gen. on General Policy Regarding Charging, Plea Negotiations, and Sentencing to All Department Employees (Feb. 5, 2025); Presidential Action on Pausing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement to Further American Economic and National Security (Feb. 10, 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/pausing-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-enforcement-to-further-american-economic-and-national-security/; see also V&E Alert: Future of FCPA Enforcement Uncertain (For Now) as New Administration Revamps the Law Enforcement Toolkit.

³ V&E Alert: Handcuffs If Your Hand is Out: New Anti-Corruption Law Finally Criminalizes the Solicitation of Bribes By Foreign Officials.

⁴ Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Criminal Division Corporate Whistleblower Awards Pilot Program, https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-division-corporate-whistleblower-awards-pilot-program (last updated May 12, 2025).

⁵ The inclusion of the FCPA as the second-highest priority subject area for whistleblower awards is a potentially noteworthy signal that the Department intends to continue to pursue FCPA cases beyond those limited only to cartels and TCOs.

⁶ Enforcement Memo, supra note 1, at 6.

⁷ Memorandum from Matthew R. Galeotti, Head of Crim. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just. on Memorandum on Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters to All Criminal Division Personnel 2 (May 12, 2025). DOJ simultaneously released another memorandum regarding the imposition and selection of corporate monitors. The memorandum directs prosecutors to consider: (1) the risk of recurrence of criminal conduct that significantly impacts U.S. interests; (2) the availability and efficacy of other independent government oversight; (3) the efficacy of the compliance program and culture of compliance at the time of the resolution; and (4) the maturity of the company’s controls and its ability to independently test and update its compliance program. Id. at 2–3.